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By Abbās Varij Kāzemi & Xiangming Chen 
 
China has spread its ties to the Middle East in ways that go beyond oil. Below, Abbās 
Varij Kāzemi and Xiangming Chen argue that the Middle East is an important region to 
watch to gain a sense of China’s next moves globally. 
 
A stroll through the stores in Tehran reveals the omnipresence of China-made consumer goods. 
State-owned China Railway Construction Corporation completed the Mecca monorail project in 
Saudi Arabia in November 2010, just in time to accommodate the 2.8 million people who arrived 
for Hajj. The agreement between China and Iran to build a railway line from Tehran to the Iraqi 
border is part of an overall plan to link the Middle East to China through Central Asia1 (see Map 
1). Despite China’s great need to import a lot of oil from the Middle East, the latter is not 
generally seen as a major and familiar territory as other regions for China’s growing global 
presence and influence. That China has spread its ties to the Middle East beyond oil reinforces 
two important issues. One is that China’s global rise and power must be understood regionally 
and locally. The other is to see China’s distinctive footprints in the Middle East in comparison to 
other regions and countries.2 
 
Oil is where we start. Relative to other aspects of the China-Middle East relationship, oil is more 
critical. This is also true of China’s strong efforts to engage with regions such as Central Asia to 
buy enough oil at reasonable prices. Fuelled by its sustained rapid economic growth over the 
past three decades, China has become the world’s largest energy consumer in less than 20 
years and accounts for almost 20% of the world’s total energy consumption today. Its booming 
economy requires China to import more than half of the oil it needs. China’s crude oil imports 
rose from 4.8 million barrels per day (bbl/d or pbd) in 2010 to 5.1 million bbl/d in 2011, and to 6 
million bbl/d in May 2012. Looking forward, China’s energy demand is expected to expand 75% 
by 2040 and double the consumption of United States (see Figure 1). According to the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), China may import about 75% of the crude oil it will 
consume by 2035 (Fazilov and Chen, p.38).2 
 
 
Oil Dependence 
Despite China’s attempt to look for alternative energy sources in different parts of the world 
such as Central Asia, its dependence on Middle Eastern oil has risen over time. The Middle 
East is currently the largest exporter of crude oil to China (see Figure 2 ). The share of oil 
imported by China from the Middle East was 48% in 1990, 49% in 2005, and 51% in 2011. It is 
expected that China’s crude oil imports from the Middle East will reach 70% by 2020 and 
continue to grow until 2035, according to the International Energy Agency. Saudi Arabia is 
China’s largest energy supplier with about one million barrels per day, accounting for 20% of 
China’s crude oil imports. Not far behind Angola is another important Middle Eastern country, 
Iran, which contributes to about 10% of China’s overall oil imports. However, it is worth pointing 
out that given China’s somewhat reluctant support for UN sanctions against Iran (more on this 
later), its oil exports to China declined by 74% from 2009 to 2010, down from a peak of 16% of 
China’s oil imports in 2009,3 when Iran was the second largest external source of oil for China. 
 
While China’s heavy dependence on Middle Eastern oil is an established fact, less is known 
about China’s early efforts to establish broad energy ties with the Middle East. Back in 1983, 
before the Chinese economy really took off, the overseas construction arm of China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) moved into the Kuwaiti market and later won an oil storage 
reconstruction project in 1995. Beijing also signed the Strategic Oil Cooperation agreement with 
Saudi Arabia in 1999, which laid the foundation for Saudi Arabia to become and remain China’s 
largest oil supplier. In exchange for stable crude supply, China has courted Saudi investment for 
expanding its refining capacity. One example is China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation’s 
(SINOPEC) meeting with Saudi Aramco to discuss a stake in a $1.2-billion refinery in the 
Chinese city of Qingdao. The two sides further joined hands in a $3.5-billion venture in Fujian 
province that included greater refinery capacity.4 
China has maintained a friendly relationship with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. A number of top 
Chinese leaders including Hu Jintao and the current president Xi Jinping have visited Saudi 
Arabia. And China has been dragging its feet on the UN sanctions against Iran. These 
diplomatic postures toward the Middle East conform to China’s pragmatic economic policies and 
interests in other energy- and commodity-rich regions. 
“China has become the world’s largest energy consumer in less than 20 years; China’s 
oil consumption growth accounted for one-third of the world’s oil consumption growth in 
2013.” 
 
Beyond Oil 
If the story about the China-Middle East nexus begins and ends with the familiar story of oil 
dependence, it is less interesting for illustrating China’s global economic influence. As with other 
regions, China has rapidly expanded its economic ties with the Middle East through trade. From 
2005 to 2009, China’s total trade volume with the Middle East rose 87%, to $100 billion and 
reached approximately $222 billion in 2012, according to China’s official statistics. This surge 
pushed China to surpass the United States as the top destination for the Middle East’s exports 
in 2010. China’s exports to the Middle East are primarily low-cost household goods that benefit 
the average Middle East consumer. An example is growing numbers of Egyptians being able to 
afford inexpensive Chinese cars. Also, residents in the Gaza Strip suffering from the Israeli 
blockade depend on cheap Chinese goods in their daily lives.1 
 
China’s investment in the Middle East has picked up speed and grown tenfold, from $1 billion in 
2005 to $11 billion in 2009. According to a tracker map of China’s global investment,5 its 
cumulative investment in Iran from 2005 to 2012 was estimated to be $18.6 billion, including 
$13.9 billion in energy sector, 2.1 billion in transportation, and 2.8 billion in metals. China 
invested around $13.6 billion in Saudi Arabia, with $5.2 billion in metals, $3.3 billion in energy, 
$2.2 billion in real estate, and the rest in transportation and other places. In Turkey, $4.3 billion 
of China’s $6.4 billion investment went into the energy sector. China became the largest foreign 
investor in both Iraq and Iran. As many African countries have done, Middle Eastern 
governments have brought Chinese contractors in to work on major infrastructure projects. 
Egypt has also partnered with China to develop its Suez special economic zone, a development 
strategy that China had used itself and promoted in Africa and the least developed parts of 
Southeast Asia like Laos (Chen and Stone).2 Despite China’s more varied investments in the 
Middle East, it remains concentrated in the energy sector (see Figure 3). This further 
establishes China’s significant dependence on the Middle East’s for energy resources, namely 
oil. 
 
Of China’s expanding economic presence in the Middle East, a lot is anchored to and funneled 
through Dubai due to its strategic crossroad location between Europe and Asia as well as its 
role as a global financial, trade, and logistics centre. Total China-UAE trade is expected to rise 
from $21 billion in 2009 to over $40 billion in 2013, and to nearly $100 billion by 2015. According 
to Dubai International Finance Centre (DIFC), around 2,300 Chinese companies had registered 
in Dubai by December 2011. Major Chinese banks have branches in Dubai including the biggest 
in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). Approximately 200,000 Chinese, 
primarily business expatriates, live in Dubai. About 70% of Chinese exports to the UAE are re-
exported from Dubai to nearby destinations like Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Jebel Ali Free Zone 
(Jafza) in Dubai hosts more than 170 major Chinese companies. Jafza-China trade stood at $11 
billion in 2012, roughly 14% of the zone’s total trade of $82 billion.6 Dubai is also building a 
Chinatown, an 800-hectare project near Dubai International Airport costing $47 million. It 
includes a business district shaped like a dragon, a great wall, and a forbidden city. Once 
completed, the development is expected to accommodate 60,000 people and will claim to be 
the world’s largest Chinatown. 
 
Once we factor in the non-oil related Chinese economic activities, China’s regional footprint 
becomes deeply visible and of significant importance. It also looks remarkably similar to the 
large and layered scope of China’s economic influence in other regions where China has moved 
beyond energy and commodities into other sectors such as urban and transport infrastructure 
(Chen and Myers).2 It is in the Middle East, however, that China’s growing role is tangled up 
with some country-specific geopolitical threads that are normally absent elsewhere. 
 
“Of China’s expanding economic presence in the Middle East, a lot is anchored to and 
funneled through Dubai due to its strategic crossroad location between Europe and Asia 
as well as its role as a global financial, trade, and logistics centre.” 
 
The Iran Factor 
While Saudi Arabia is critical to China as the latter’s largest oil supplier from the Middle East, 
much of China’s existing and expanding role in the region is linked to Iran and its larger 
geopolitical importance. China-Iran trade rose from $400 million in 1994 to $11 billion in 2008 
and finally to $50 billion in 2012. Fifty percent of Iran’s total trade is now with China, Iran’s third 
largest trading partner. Since the early 1990s, China has been helping Iran build and rebuild 
infrastructure projects such as highways, subways, factories, dams, ports, airports, shipyards, 
and energy projects, some of which were severely damaged during the Iran-Iraq war. One of the 
few countries that have violated the US-led sanctions against Iran, China opposed tougher 
sanctions pushed by the United States to curtail Iran’s oil exports before the recently concluded 
nuclear deal in Geneva to ease overall sanctions. China’s reason for opposing the sanctions 
was that ‘the sanctions that will hurt the interests of a third party’,7which refers to none other 
than China itself. Beginning in 2014, China is looking to raise crude oil imports from Iran that 
could cause more tension with the United States. In addition, China’s state-owned Zhuhai 
Zhenrong Corp, which was sanctioned by Washington in early 2012 to supply gasoline to Iran, 
has begun talks with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) for a new contract.8 
While economically invaluable to China, Iran poses a political and diplomatic dilemma to China. 
Iran is one of very few countries in the world that supplies plenty of oil to China and offers 
lucrative opportunities for China to undertake infrastructure projects. These economic benefits 
weigh heavily in China’s strenuous effort to balance them against doing the diplomatic ‘right 
thing’ when it comes to sanctioning Iran or not. The ‘middle of the road’ approach taken by 
China thus far is to officially advocate diplomacy and negotiation as a solution on one hand, and 
go along with the UN sanctions on the other. In navigating this ‘happy medium’, China continues 
to stay close to Iran for its oil and other business opportunities. 
One added benefit for China in dealing with Iran is to exploit its favorable geographic location. 
Bordering the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, Iran can serve as an inevitable geographic 
bridge to China’s efforts to secure energy resources in Central Asia and the Middle East (see 
Map 1), a critical locational influence Robert Kaplan calls ‘the Iranian pivot’.9 China imports a lot 
of energy, both oil and gas, from the Caspian Sea to reduce its dependence on oil from the 
Persian Gulf nations. An active participant in the Caspian Sea oil and gas projects, China has 
brought and channeled energy through the long pipelines that fan out east from the Caspian 
Sea and snake through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan into Xinjiang and the rest of 
China (Fazilov and Chen).2 China’s ambition to secure more Central Asian oil has been 
facilitated by the Neka pipeline in northern Iran, constructed by a consortium of Chinese oil 
companies including both CNPC and SINOPEC in 2003. 
 
“The entire Middle East is fast becoming a region where China’s shadow of activity and 
influence looms larger.” 
 
A Larger Shadow 
While Iran is close to the heart of China’s presence in the Middle East, economically and 
geopolitically, the entire Middle East is fast becoming a region where China’s shadow of activity 
and influence looms larger, with implications beyond the China-Middle East bilateral 
relationship. 
Firstly, China has extended its economic interests far and wide in the Middle East beyond its 
heavy purchase of oil. China has obtained substantial growth in trading with and building 
infrastructure in many Middle Eastern countries. In the midst of all this economic gain, China 
has maintained a pragmatic, non-interventionist stance regarding the big issues. Besides the 
Iran nuclear issue discussed earlier, China has stayed more or less neutral in the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict and managed to earn a constructive role in the eyes of both Palestinian and 
Israeli leaders. Regarding the crisis in Syria, China has adopted a moderate position and 
advocated for a political solution supplemented by its humanitarian efforts to help build hospitals 
in Jordan for Syrian refugees. In a nutshell, China is ‘looking for the Middle in the Middle East’.10 
As in other regions, China has followed its economic inroads and political non-interference in 
the Middle East with a strong push for cultural exchange. The China-Arab States Cooperation 
Forum founded in 2002 aims to promote cultural exchange through the Confucius Institutes in 
the Middle East and cooperative academic programs. Universities in the Middle East have 
launched programs in Chinese Studies, while leading regional academic institutions such as 
University of Tehran and Cairo University already have Chinese Studies programs. Around 
1,500 Saudi students studied in China recently.11 Approximately 200 Arab graduate students 
studied in China from 2005 to 2010.12 Cultural exchange has also opened the door for Chinese 
tourists to the Middle East. Prior to the recent revolution in Egypt, some 65,000 Chinese tourists 
were reported to have travelled to Egypt. Chinese also top the list of the yearly 10 million 
tourists in Dubai. Every year, around 15,000 pilgrims from China visit Saudi Arabia. This raises 
a longer-term question of whether China’s cultural ‘soft power’ will catch up to its economic 
power in the Middle East. 
 
“For China to connect with Europe and Africa, the Middle East is the necessary 
geographic bridge in China’s official scheme to enact a ‘New Silk Road’ from its 
northwest through Central Asia.” 
 
As part of China’s economic, political, and cultural ties with the Middle East, there is a distinctive 
religious dimension. Islam offers an additional channel for interactions between China and the 
Middle East. China has a significant Muslim population who are committed to the rituals of 
Islam. China has begun sending a number of its Muslim students to the Middle East to serve 
religious communities and activities as well as to acquire Arabic language skills. Religious 
commodities are manufactured in China and exported to Muslim countries. In holy cities in Iran 
(Qom), Iraq (Karbala and Najaf), and Saudi Arabia (Mecca and Medina), which attract large 
numbers of Muslims for religious rituals, Chinese commodities with religious meanings and 
usage are being sold and include the digital Quran, prayer items, and veils and scarves for 
women.13 The majority of these religious products are produced by communities of Chinese 
Muslims in Ningxia province of northwestern China. This dimension of the contemporary China-
Middle East relationship is not unexpected given the extensive network of economic and cultural 
ties that have existed historically along the ancient Silk Road. For China to connect with Europe 
and Africa, the Middle East is the necessary geographic bridge in China’s official scheme to 
enact a ‘New Silk Road’ from its northwest through Central Asia. Couched with a historical 
nostalgia, the concept of a ‘New Silk Road’ could be used by China as a grand politico-
economic strategy to (re)build a modern grid of pipelines and roads for energy supplies and 
trade ties from its own region through Central Asia to the Middle East and farther beyond.14 
Finally, the ancient Silk Road serves as a modern-day political lens for how the Middle East and 
China see each other’s development. Given their shared ancient civilisations, strong traditional 
values, collectivist cultures, patriarchal social systems, and centralised political systems, do 
some Middle Eastern countries view China’s model and road of development as more 
appealing? The city of Singapore not only has inspired some of Dubai’s approach to 
development15 but also influenced how China has attempted to achieve fast economic growth 
without losing political control and social stability. As China and the Middle East have become 
more connected, they are also considering where these strong ties may take them on their 
respective paths of development. All in all, the Middle East is a prominent world region to watch 
to gain a sense of China’s next moves globally. 
 
We thank Kayla Chen for her careful reading of an earlier draft and Ivan Su, a sophomore at 
Trinity College, for some research assistance. We also thank Mustafa Ibraheem at Trinity 
College for having produced Map 1 for the article. 
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